Comments on Resource Conservation Recovery Act 
Part B Permit Application for the Process Equipment Waste Evaporator  
at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory

Submitted on Behalf of the Environmental Defense Institute
by
Chuck Broscious

December 22, 2000

    The Department of Energy (DOE) issued notice 11/7/00 to Idaho Department of Environmental Quality (IDEQ) and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for Resource Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA) pre-application Part B permit for the Process Equipment Waste Evaporator (PEWE). The "fact sheet" advertised in the notice offered no useful information about what specific RCRA units within and related to the PEWE were under permit consideration. DOE's effort to divide and segment out the non-complainant components of the PEWE must be challenged by the regulators because it is contrary to the comprehensive mandate of RCRA. DOE's PEWE fact sheet offers no specific indication what is included save for a generalized statement "that it includes steam operated evaporators, storage and treatment tanks, and ancillary equipment." "The permit will request that [Bechtel] and DOE-ID be allowed to store and treat hazardous wastes in tank systems and allow miscellaneous treatment evaporation of hazardous wastes within the system." The public can hardly formulate substantive comments when denied access to essential plant operations. Documents gained through Public Information Requests relating to INEEL RCRA Compliance Quarterly Meetings disclose that DOE submitted PEWE application nearly a year ago, yet denied the public legal notice or information.

   The PEWE permit suffers from the same deficiencies as the Calciner and other high-level radioactive and hazardous waste treatment operations due to fundamental inability and/or refusal to monitor what goes out the stack. The following 1996 internal INEL [sic] Notegram on "Air Legacy Issues" gained by EDI through a Freedom of Information Act request acknowledges turning off air monitors.

   "For much of the last 3 years, INEL has chosen to not operate the ICPP Main Stack Iodine-129 monitor based on a "literal" reading of the NESHAP's regulations. (NESHAPs requires continuous monitoring of those constituents which represent 10% or more of the potential INEL dose.) I-129 from the ICPP Main Stack represents the single largest actual dose contributor at the INEL (at times, 50% of the site dose).It is our belief (and that of ORNL personnel) that the current monitoring policy for I-129 on the CPP Main Stack is not consistent with the intent of the regulations and represents a significant liability. (Even if defendable in court, it is difficult to explain to the public why it is a good idea to "not operate an already installed monitor" for the largest dose contributor on the INEL.) (Note that the I-129 monitor is now on-line for the startup of the High Level Waste Evaporator, but future intent is to take it off-line again.) [INEL Notegram, July 25, 1996 to C.L. Tellez from M.E. Feldman][emphasis in original]

   All these high-level waste treatment operations, such as the High-level Waste Evaporator, PEWE, and the Liquid Effluent Treatment and Disposal (LET&D) are tied to the same problematic, storage tank, emission control, and monitoring systems. More than seven Defense Facility Nuclear Safety Board (DFNSB) reports in the last five years identified serious operational and safety violations at these operations and related support systems. The DFNSB is a quasi independent entity established by Congress to review DOE operations as a substitute for Nuclear Regulatory Commission jurisdiction. Regulators do not appear to be tracking these major safety reports when they evaluate DOE's permit applications and the veracity of DOE's claim to compliance with safety regulations. Additionally, there have been dozens of accidents, worker exposures, and system failures related to these operations at ICPP (see Attachment B listing).

   Some of the PEWE waste feed tanks are the subject IDEQ Notice of Violations (NOV) 8/2/99 due to DOE's failure to inspect overfill/spill control in the tank sumps. DOE has had a chronic instrument failure problem that shows how much overfill/spill waste is in the sumps. Some of the tanks reportedly have secondary containment but do not meet full RCRA containment criteria (i.e. are the concrete curbs around the tanks with a floor drain to a sump fully compliant with RCRA that require an impervious stainless steel lining and reliable visual daily sump/tank monitoring). The problem is the tanks are so "hot" that it is an extreme worker exposure issue to go in and physically check the tanks/sumps when the instruments fail as documents since 1997 show. DOE also tried to "gerryrig" a plastic diaper around one tank in an effort the meet the secondary containment requirement.

   The State's position all along is to do everything to reduce the liquid volume in the high-level Tank Farm as rapidly as possible and thereby reduce the undisputed significant hazard of a tank failure and the resultant additional contamination of Idaho's sole source aquifer. This is not summarily discounted, but DOE just plays along with this for decades without implementing a final legally compliant solution. The INEEL High-Level Waste Environmental Impact Statement (HLW/EIS) certainly is a step towards that definitive policy decision (due out in January 2001), however continuing to operate the PEWE and other illegal operations and not acknowledge these non-compliant operations in the overall HLW program is not acceptable, and is a violation of National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Moreover, the HLW/EIS offered only a few dozen words spread over four different sections on the three high-level evaporators. No listing exists in the EIS index for these operations. This is a fundamental flaw in the EIS for not providing the substantive analysis of all the interrelated systems. The "functional equivalence test" requirement in RCRA to meet the substantive requirement in NEPA also has not been met in terms of offering a holistic analysis of the cumulative impacts of the operation, because of DOE's segmented approach to permitting. That is why NEPA requires "programmatic" EIS's to evaluate the impact of interrelated operations.

   Another unacceptably crucial issue is the alternative in DOE's INEEL High-Level Waste Environmental Impact Statement (HLW/EIS) to leave the high-level Tank Farm "heals" (tank sediments) and grout [cement] them in place as permanent disposal. This alternative is illegal because grout is not an approved treatment nor do the tanks meet the deep geologic compliance requirements. These evaporators are running full bore to reduce the liquid volume. If DOE continues to use this illegal program, they will avoid having to build a vitrification plant at INEEL and just ship the stored solid calcine to Hanford for final vitrification (also an alternative in the EIS) and just grout the INEEL Tank Farm as final disposal.

   Evaporation is not a RCRA approved treatment for high-level-liquid-waste (HLLW) under the EPA's Universal Treatment Standards, only vitrification qualifies (40 CFR 268.40). DOE's argument is that the evaporators are just a pre-treatment, and not intended as the final treatment. In actuality, the evaporators may end up being the last "treatment" the HLLW gets, if the tank sediments are left in place. There is no class of treatment in the CFR's called "pre-treatment." The evaporators are in the general category of "thermal treatment" unit in that it is a devise that "uses elevated temperatures as the primary means to change the chemical, physical, or biological character of the hazardous waste," [40 CFR 262.34] and therefore, subject to all the performance requirements of that treatment class.

   The Director of EPA's Washington Office of Solid Waste issued a memorandum to Region IX related to issues on the combustion of hazardous waste that states: ".... the view of this Office is that , in most cases, the literal line between incineration and non-incineration is not the main concern. Rather, the primary concern from an environmental standpoint is whether proper controls are applied to the combustion or thermal treatment process in question. The RCRA regulatory framework provides the authority and responsibility to impose adequate controls whether the unit is classified as a combustor or miscellaneous unit." [EPA memo 8/18/97] [also see 40 CFR 264.600 subpart X]

   DOE fails to offer RCRA requirement for thermal treatment operations to conduct the equivalent of "trial burns" to demonstrate compliance with RCRA, MACT, and TSCA. We challenge these segmented operations and the regulators must force DOE to acknowledge that all these operations are physically connected by pipes, ducts, and tanks, and therefore all operations must meet regulatory requirements and also must be permitted collectively. If some RCRA units are not to be included in the permit, then a closure plan must be approved and immediately implemented to assure the public that the old "unpermittable" units will not be surreptitiously used by DOE.

   The PEWE located in CPP-604 processes Calciner (now temporarily closed), High-level Liquid Waste Evaporator off-gas scrub solutions, and other high-level waste treatment plant wastes. The decontamination/decommissioning process operations continue to generate considerable liquid waste volumes. The two PEW evaporators, EVAP-WL161 & WL-129 (classified as thermal treatment) accept liquid waste from the feed tanks and subject it to high temperatures (via steam heat exchanger) which concentrates the liquid waste by means of evaporation. The solids (concentrated bottoms) are managed as high-level mixed waste and sent to the Tank Farm for eventual calcination, or other final treatment. The condensate (overheads) is managed (inappropriately in my view) as low-level mixed waste and can be recycled back to the evaporators or sent to service waste (percolation ponds) or Liquid Effluent Treatment and Disposal (LET&D), that primarily removes the nitric acid component of the overheads. DOE does not offer a statement of where waste goes after the LET&D, especially the nitric acid now that the Calciner is shutdown. DOE's INEL[sic] Interim Status Analysis however states that the LET&D vapors will be filtered through HEPA filters prior to discharge to the main plant stack. The facility has a design capacity of 1100 gal/hr.[pg 6] The PEW off-gas system also only uses HEPA filters prior to going to the main stack which means all volatilized hazardous and radioactive material escape to the atmosphere. Since these PEWE and LET&D operations are physically connected, it must legally be permitted as a whole.

   The PEW waste can originate from various points within the INTEC (including the high-level tank farm) and also accepts waste water from other INEEL facilities. Three PEW feed tanks in CPP-604 upstream of the evaporators have a capacity of 15,000 gallons/day (VES-WL-106, 107, and 163). CPP-604 PEW feed/storage tanks (VES-WL-132, 102, and 133) have a 43,800 gallon/day capacity. DOE requested in May 1999 to increase the capacity. The HLW/PEIS rates the PEWE at 105,000 gallons/year with the volume reduction (via evaporation) to 5,000 gallons. [C.6-37] This is a large capacity operation by any standards with the vaporized release rate equivalent out the stack of 100,000 gallons/year.

   Three 15,000 gallon tanks (located in CPP-604) receive PEWE condensate overheads from two PEWE evaporators prior to going to percolation ponds or the LET&D. The total number of waste tanks associated with the PEWE is thirteen, many of which date back to 1953 [VOV 11/97 pg F-6, 11] The PEWE tanks have been the subject of Notice of Violations (NOV) since at least 1996 and the latest 8/2/99 for failure to monitor tank leak sumps. The total number of PEW "vessels" and "tanks" is thirty-five. [NOV-8/2/99] This is an old and complex system located in at least three separate buildings, and DOE has yet to document that all the components (including the connecting pipes and off-gas emission control system) are compliant with 40 CFR 265.193. Due to a long history of Tank Farm service line leaks due to non-existent secondary containment, regulators must not allow DOE to claim these systems as "ancillary" in an effort to avoid full RCRA compliance.

   In June 2000, DOE submitted a RCRA Part A Permit Modification for PEWE tank VES-WL-132 to change its classification from a treatment tank to just a storage tank. DOE fails to adequately explain why this tank is equipped with "internal heating coils, and lifting lugs, such that when and if the tank is full of sand and other sediments, it could be removed from the cell..." if it is not part of the treatment process as a sediment separation unit. [6/00 RCRA Justification] The sediments left in the tank remain high-level waste and must be appropriately managed. Changing the classification from treatment to storage benefits DOE because of less restrictive monitoring criteria. The tank is in a heavily shielded concrete cell with a one-ton concrete plug access port that can only be removed by a crane. Entry into the tank cell by workers would cause extreme radiation exposure. Since the instruments are chronically failing that monitor the leak sumps and DOE can not send workers in to physically monitor the leak detection system, DOE is illegally trying to change the classification.

   Another permit vulnerability DOE has is all the piping service lines inside and outside connecting the various buildings and the tank farm that are required to have stainless seamless secondary containment and leak detection systems. DOE replaced some of these lines that previously leaked but it is uncertain and is uncertified that all the lines in use have been upgraded, especially the pipes inside the treatment buildings. These operations and equipment date back to the early 1950's. [NOV-041 Attachment B page F-6]

   The EPA 6/6/00 INEEL RCRA Work plan offers in the back a history of the permitting process showing how over some 14 years DOE has generated revised Part A and B Applications ......ad nauseam and claims compliance by virtue of all these nearly annual submittals. The bottom line is DOE never submitted adequate application information to qualify for a permit and the state and EPA allowed DOE to string along on interim status, and never forcing the permit issue. The regulators are therefor liable for non-enforcement of all applicable statutes.

   DOE has from the beginning lumped all of INEEL into a single RCRA Part A/B application and then recently applied for partial facility permits DOE's 9/29/99 Determination Report for Tanks included in Voluntary Consent Order Action Plan lists 37 RCRA units that are not specifically listed in the Part A application and they propose not modifying the Part A or the Part B until after the processes are permitted and even then the "design capacity and other information required of specific regulated units will not be included." Four tanks and two heat exchangers of the 37 are related to the PEW and are listed as interim status, which DOE must fully describe in the PEW permit (a separate partial Part B). Additionally, there are five other RCRA units that are multiple use but include PEW discharges that DOE wants to pass off and "describe in one of the permits to be developed." This DOE failure to include all the PEW units in the Part A/B and the PEW partial permit application yet substantively relying on the Part A/B to procedurally comply with RCRA is illegal.

   The 6/6/00 RCRA Work Plan lists a 1/00 revised Part A approved by DEQ on 4/3/00 and no mention of status of Part B. So it remains uncertain if the Part A/B were revised to include all the PEWE related RCRA units. However, page 10 of this 6/6/00 Work Plan lists seven PEW tanks with a note "volume 14 permit application is currently being revised" and the unit status for all is interim status. On page 12 it lists three "CPP-604 Tank Farm Tanks (VES-WL-100, 101, AND 102) will be permitted as feed, storage, and bottoms tanks in the PEWE Part B Permit Application." This sounds like DOE is merging the partial PEWE permit as a partial Part B. And the status [page 12] of these tanks "operate under NON/CO and will be closed per schedule outlined in the NON/CO." These are in the "un-permittable" underground high-level tanks. Again, using unpermittable RCRA units as part of the operating system is illegal.

   The September 1999 Quarterly Meeting also lists (in addition to the above mentioned Tank Farm) the three 5,000 gallon "Westside Waste Holdup Tanks [CPP-641] for the newly defined PEWE subsystems for Part B Permit applications." The Quarterly Meeting (3/98) notes: "It was also stated that the DEQ will not grant a permit for units (such as the HLWE) that discharge to a non-permittable facility." Also noted is discussion of the off-gas systems; "It was determined that these off-gas systems will most likely fall under RCRA regulations." "A concern at the ICPP was discussed, regarding the volatile and semi-volatile compounds in the liquid waste being processed in the process off-gas system the off-gas from the thermal treatment units and the liquid waste fed into the units [PEWE, LET&D, NWCF, and NWCF ETS] will be sampled routinely." Clearly, these units would also need a TSCA permit which requires continuous real-time monitoring. Based on the waste codes listed in the Part A application, the evaporators do not qualify as treatment under 40 CFR 268.48.

   September 29, 1999 Determination Report tries to make the case that off-gas systems, tanks, and piping are "ancillary equipment" and therefore not required to meet RCRA standards. This is a deliberate attempt to obfuscate RCRA's requirements and must not be allowed.

   The Hazardous Waste Combustor Maximum Achievable Control Technology (MACT) apply. These standards are promulgated by EPA under joint authority of the Clean air Act and RCRA and reflect Maximum Achievable Control Technologies specified by the Clean Air Act. MACT emission standards for dioxins/furans, mercury, semi-volatile metals (cadmium and lead), low volatile metals (arsenic, beryllium, chromium and antimony, hydrochloric acid and chlorine ( combined), particulate matter, carbon monoxide, and hydrocarbons from existing and new hazardous waste treatment units. The HLLWE, PEWE and the LET&D generate these types of emissions, therefore MACT and TSCA applies.

   EPA promulgated in 1998 Universal Treatment Standards in 40 CFR 268.40 for hazardous waste. The regulation assigns waste codes to individual contaminants as well as assigning treatment standards that must be met. DOE's RCRA Permit revision #19 (4/99) lists the PEWE waste codes that include 128 individual hazardous waste processed by the PEWE (see attached list). This list also identifies five "F code" waste solvents in the PEWE waste stream. The "F list" and the other listed waste codes processed by the PEWE do not meet the Universal Treatment Standards in 40 CFR 268.40. The "F listed" wastes include groups of spent halogenated solvents, and non-halogenated solvents that EPA Universal Treatment Standards require dedicated combustion technology as the only approved treatment. The PEWE as an evaporator and therefore does not meet this treatment standard. Evaporators are the worst possible "treatment" because the volatile organic compounds (VOC) and radionuclides go out the stack untreated. That is why EPA requires dedicated combustion units to destroy the VOC's and appropriate off-gas scrubbers/resin filters to remove the products of incomplete combustion (PIC). The HEPA filters used only remove the larger particulate material in the off-gas.

   DOE uses a treatment code of T04 for the PEWE, however, 40 CFR 264 Appendix Table 2 (revised 7/00), there is no T01 through T05. The first listed is T06 through T94. DOE refers to EPA form 8700-23 which DOE has filled in using the code T04. For the codes to have any authenticity they must reflect what is in the CFR's.

   In summary, EDI objects to the illegal segmentation of the permitting process that fails to include all interrelated operations and fails to include all applicable regulations (i.e. RCRA, MACT and TSCA) that require trial burns to demonstrate compliance. Since the PEWE has been operating for over 15 years, it is unconscionable that these emissions data have yet to be compiled given the extremely hazardous materials being processed. Even if DOE is allowed by the regulators to classify the three ICPP evaporators as "pre-treatment" and not "final treatment", the emission control requirements of all thermal treatment units still apply. Until such time that DOE has a compliant "final treatment" facility operating, the evaporators must be considered by default, "final treatment." Regulators must enforce the laws of the land and force DOE to immediately close all illegal operations and start construction of treatment plants that will meet all applicable environmental statutes.

                                                         Attachment A

What is the "Definition" of the PEWE?

By Dave McCoy 12/16/00

9/21-22/99 RCRA Quarterly Minutes state that a conference call was to be made to discuss the definition of the PEWE. Since I was excluded from that secret meeting, I will offer my own analysis. I also request the minutes of that meeting be sent to me and placed in a repository file for this proceeding.

i. 40 CFR 260.10 defines Thermal treatment as the treatment of hazardous waste in a device which uses elevated temperatures as the primary means to change the chemical, physical, or biological character or composition of the hazardous waste.

ii. 40 CFR 265 Subpart P covers facilities that thermally treat hazardous wastes in devices other than enclosed devices using flame controlled combustion.

iii. The PEWE releases solid or hazardous waste into the atmosphere, the PEWE is not a totally enclosed treatment unit. (See 5/1/87 Evaporator Used to Remove Water From Hazardous Waste where an evaporator treating aqueous waste hazardous because of its metal content met the definition of a thermal treatment device. www.epa.gov/rcraonline).

iv. Laboratories at INTEC are adding F-listed wastes to the ICPP Liquid Waste System which is being treated by the PEWE. (3/2-3/98 RCRA QM Minutes). F-listed wastes have EPA Hazardous Waste Numbers F020, F021,F022, F023, F026 OR F027.

v. F-listed wastes thermally treats in a facility such as the PEWE must comply with the standards and procedures in Sec. 265.383. (40 CFR265.1(d)(v). DOE must show that the PEWE complies with the performance standards of subpart O of part 264 when they burn these wastes. It is believed that DOE has not complied with this section regarding certification that these standards can be met and is thus illegally operating pursuant to interim standard requirements.. Nor has any tentative decision of the Assistant Administrator issued with proper notification and opportunity for a public hearing.

vi. 40 CFR 265.375 provides that waste analyses are required by 265.13. 265.13 requires that "Before an owner or operator treats, stores, or disposes of any hazardous waste...he must obtain a detailed chemical and physical analysis of a representative sample of the wastes... in accordance with this part and part 268 ..." It is believed that DOE has not complied with this section regarding prior waste analysis and is thus illegally operating pursuant to interim standard requirements.

vii. 40 CFR 265.377 sets forward monitoring and inspection requirements with which the PEWE is not in compliance and is illegally operating during interim status.

viii. apply to the PEWE. Because these operating requirements have not been specified for the PEWE, PEWE has not operated in accordance with 40CFR 264 Subpart O requirements. The PEWE is operating illegally. Interim status does not constitute a permit.

a. There is applicability of 40 CFR 264 subparts AA (Air Emission Standards for Process Vents), BB (Air Emission Standards for Equipment Leaks), and CC.

b. There is applicability of NESHAPs subparts A, C, E, H, I, U

c. There is applicability of MACT requirements

d. There is applicability of Trial burn requirements

e. There is applicability of Best Demonstrated Available Technology is vitrification of high level radioactive wastes. (63 FR 28575).

f. An environmental risk assessment sufficient to meet NEPA standards is required.

g. A Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) permit requirement [15 U.S.C. ss 2605(e); 2619 (a)(1)] [40 CFR 761] exists given all the Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs) in the waste going through the PEW.

ATTACHMENT B

Accidents and incidents related facilities at INTEC (formerly Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP) between 1988 and July 2000

Source: U.S. DOE Office of Nuclear and Facility Safety, Operating Experience Weekly Summary and U.S. DOE Daily Field Management Reports, Lockheed Martin Idaho Co. unusual occurrence reports, unless otherwise cited.

* 1988*

October 30: An INTEC Explosion causing one fatality and also resulted in a Radioactive ruthenium filter gel release of 0.17 curies at the Main Stack.

*1990*

Nov. 16; Contamination at 4,000 cpm beta-gamma spread outside a controlled area at ICPP-603.

*1991*

Jan.29; Calciner stack monitor found out of calibration.

Feb.11; ICPP fuel dissolver exploded, spraying three workers with highly enriched uranium and heated nitric acid; a fourth worker was also exposed when he came to their aid. The facility remains closed because of explosion damage and high levels of contamination. The Office of Nuclear Safety concluded that the initial contractor investigation & the corrective actions taken by the DOE/ID were inadequate. [Judge Ryan Opinion @ 53].

June 10; The State of Idaho files RCRA air/water quality violations and fines totaling $127,793.

June 25; An operator's left hand was contaminated up to 100 millirem beta gamma and 3,000 counts per minute beta gamma on his right hand at the Calciner while cleaning liquid sample cell.

July 4; Denitrator Off-gas drain malfunction results in high alpha contamination at ICPP (Zone-III).

July 25; Calciner activated rapid shutdown system due to off-gas compressor shutdown during power failure.

Aug.6; Personnel contamination to 500 cpm (counts per minute on radiation detection instruments) at ICPP-627 Radiological Materials Area.

Aug.6; The Calciner shutdown due to plugged filters; however, it took nearly three hours before the operators shut down and no spare filter banks were available during that time.

Sept.13; Failure of the Calciner off-gas atmospheric protection system (APS) High Efficiency Particulate Arrester (HEPA) filters. The HEPA filters, numbers F-OGF-100/101/102 failed a special requested DOP (dioctylphthalate) test after nine months of service. When the filters were changed out it was discovered the filter media had deteriorated. Two of the filters had the filter media missing or partially missing. The third filter's media was intact, but was discolored. Depending on when the filters failed, the APS may have operated for the entire nine months without HEPA filters. ID-WINC-ICPP-1991-1058.

Nov.28; ICPP evacuated after radiation alarms sound. [Times News November 28, 1991]

Dec. 22; ICPP-604 Process off-gas System HEPA filter monitors inoperable.

*1992*

Jan.6; Inspection found 9 alarms disconnected at the ICPP.

Jan.19; ICPP Process Off-gas System blowers failed for two days while Calciner and other operations continued to operate.

Jan.24 Calciner exceeded State limits on nitrogen oxide on five different occasions between 6/89 to 1/92.

Apr. 1; Unauthorized removal of criticality alarm system warblers at the ICPP.

Apr. 2; Employees forced to stay inside of ICPP due to an unplanned radiation release from the main stack containing 3 millirem per hour (mrem/hr) beta-gamma. [ID-WINC-ICPP-1992-0035]. Contaminants spread beyond the ICPP boundary fence. Judge Ryan cited flakes the size of quarters falling on 40 acres around ICPP, and DOE sent notice of this incident to Idaho and the Fort Hall Reservation with a cover page erroneously stating "This is a Drill." [Ryan @ 53][also see Daily Operations Brief of 4/3/92, stating flakes 2 inches in diameter were released]. The released radionuclide composition was Cs-137, Sb-125, and Ru-106.

June 25; Personnel contamination to 3,000 cpm beta-gamma at the ICPP Calciner.

July 1; Calciner HEPA filter failure due to rapid pressure rise and defective or failed filter material. This incident occurred while spare filter bank was undergoing filter change out and was not available for use. Three hours elapsed before the decision was made to shut down the Calciner.

July 18; ICPP Calciner unplanned shutdown due to clogged HEPA filters.

July 25; Calciner activation of the rapid shutdown system due to compressor failure.

Aug.2; Power failure at ICPP and 70 mph wind storm causes significant building damage.

Aug.19; Personnel skin contamination at the ICPP New Waste Calcining Facility.

Aug.21; Release of radioactivity from ICPP main stack - 25,000 counts per minute (cpm).

Aug.25; Unauthorized disconnection of alarms in ICPP-637.

Sept.1; Loss of stand-by power to evacuation sirens at the ICPP Remote Analytical Lab.

Sept.12; Personnel contaminated to 20,000 dpm (disintegrations per minute measured on a radiation instrument) at the ICPP New Waste Calciner.

Sept.17; Power outage at ICPP-604 Waste Treatment and loss of instrumentation and ventilation - these facilities operate the ICPP off-gas emission systems.

Sept.21; Personnel contamination to 10,000 dpm in the ICPP-604 sample corridor.

Sept.22; ICPP Calciner radiation detection instruments found out of tolerance.

Sept.23; Three personnel contaminated to 1,500 cpm at Calciner.

Sept.27; Sixteen radiation monitors found out of compliance at ICPP and instead of replacing the monitors managers chose to rescind the compliance order.

Oct.21; Loss of control of radioactive material, building contamination to 50,000 dpm (disintegrations per minute measured on a radiation instrument) at ICPP-603.

Nov.15; Personnel contamination to 400 cpm (counts per minute measured on a radiation instrument) at the ICPP Calciner.

Nov.19; Personnel contamination to 10,000 cpm (counts per minute measured on a radiation instrument) at the ICPP Calciner.

Nov.28; ICPP evacuated because of radionuclide particulate releases at CPP-603.

Dec.1; ICPP High-level waste tanks WM-101 and 102 vault sump level instrument probes (leak detection) were discovered to be connected to the transmitter in reverse.

Dec.27; Kerosene fire in the Calciner Cell of the New Waste Calcining Facility. During cold operations of the Calciner kerosene fuel which had leaked from a Calciner fuel nozzle ignited resulting in a small fire in the Calciner vessel cell floor which burned for about 35 minutes. Nozzle connection was installed improperly (threads reversed).

*1993*

Jan.4; Criticality Alarm System Warblers found Inoperable in CPP-651 and 603.

Jan.6; Unsafe entry into ICPP WL-101/102 Tank vaults by health physics technicians not wearing proper protection.

Jan 9; New Waste Calciner forced to shut down due to plugged final off-gas filter plugging

Jan.28; New Waste Calciner again forced to shut down due to defective off-gas filters

Mar.9; Calciner worker contaminated to 12,000 Disintegrations per minute (dpm) and other areas of the mezzanine where the      worker was were found to be contaminated to 100,000 dpm

Mar.13; Worker contamination to 800 dpm at CPP-604 tank farm.

*1996*

July 22; Five construction workers were contaminated during demolition of the ICPP Waste Calcine Facility. Whole body counts showed 500 mrem (millirem) internal exposure to Cs-137, Sr-90, Pu-238, and Pu-239. The five workers were not wearing respirators yet were working in the immediate area where another group of workers were cutting and removing piping that contained contamination. LMITCO fined $25,000 by DOE for violations of nuclear safety regulations under the Price Anderson Amendments Act. [Star 3/11/97]

June 5; Worker exposed to 40,000 dpm (Disintegrations per minute measured on a radiation instrument) of Gd-153, Eu-152, and Co-60 during decontamination of Hot Cell Facility despite wearing a double set of Personnel Protective Equipment. [6/9/97 DOB].

Aug 25; Five workers were exposed to nitrogen oxides while conducting a remote video inspection of underground ICPP Calciner valve box. NIOSH safety limits of 5 ppm (parts per million) were exceeded but the immediately dangerous to life limit of 20 ppm were not exceeded.

Aug 25; State of Idaho Division of Environmental Quality sent DOE/ID a Notice of Non-Compliance for 135 violations of Hazardous Waste Management Act and set penalties at $892,725.

Sept 19; DOE Office of Enforcement and Investigation issued Notice of Violation under the Price-Anderson Act to Lockheed Martin Idaho Technologies and INEEL Operations Office for six Severity Level III safety violations.

Dec 8; ICPP New Waste Calcine facility maintenance fitter was contaminated after he removed his acid suit in a high contamination area. A radiological control technician measured 8,000 dpm beta/gamma on the fitter s knees, 3,200 dpm (Disintegrations per minute measured on a radiation instrument) beta/gamma on his stomach, and 39,000 dpm beta/gamma on his modesty clothing. The fitter had removed his acid suit during the job because of heat stress caused by inadequate breaks and excessive hours.

*1998*

Jan 6; INTEC fire resulted from an overheated diesel powered water pump when the discharge line froze; caused when an engine overheated and caused a fire because the cooling water drain was plugged with ice and prevented circulation of cooling water through the engine coolant heat exchanger.

Jan.19; Maintenance electrician contaminated at INTEC with 12,000 counts per minute beta-gamma. Gamma scan found cesium-137 contamination at 6,000 cpm. [1998-0002]

Aug.9; INTEC plant wide emergency communications and alarm system failed and the backup power system and battery backup also failed.

Oct.7; Fire Alarms found inoperable at INTEC.

Sept.; DOE Office of Oversight Progress Report September 1998 found that "Workplace safety at INEEL has deteriorated since 1994" and that "corrective actions plan found that deficiencies were not resolved and that lessons learned from previous accidents were not being effectively applied. In environmental management and controls, data indicate weak regulatory compliance and inadequate, short-term, quick-fix solutions. Long term solutions are only in the conceptual stages, with no defined strategies, plans of action, or milestones." "Specifically, one-fifth of all INEEL occurrences in 1997 were related to radiation protection (personnel contamination) and environmental management occurrences have increased by one-third from 1994 through 1997."

Sept.1; INTEC radiation laboratory analysts received internal plutonium-239 exposure from inhalation that measured 0.1 mrem (millirem) from unprotected work on plutonium-contaminated graphite molds.

Sept. ; DOE Oversight Analysis Group issues Office of Oversight Progress Report covering INEEL s non-compliance with environmental regulations, poor implementation of worker safety and health programs and privatization issues. The report cited, "workplace safety performance has deteriorated," "recurring problems in work control and facility authorization basis, noncompliance with environmental regulations...." "INEEL has not established an effective process to pro-actively track and prioritize corrective actions. Further, ES&H functions and activities are not always integrated into programs or work planning." "Worker competence and safety performance are also impacted by the reduction enforce at INEEL since the beginning of integrated management. The reductions have affected the experience level of workers and reduced morale. Since 1994, INEEL has experienced to workplace fatalities, a serious electrical shock, and many unplanned exposures and near misses involving workplace hazards." "Significant weaknesses are also noted in INEEL s environmental management program as shown by the site s having received four Notices of Violation from the State of Idaho for environmental non compliance since 1994, as well as 4 of the 26 DOE Enforcement Actions issued by DOE through June 1998." "In recent years, weakness in work planning and controls have resulted in two Type A accidents as well as many near misses involving workplace hazards. The identified programmatic deficiencies include insufficient worker training, lack of hazard identification and control, and inadequate supervision of work."

Dec.22; Six workers contaminated at the New Waste Calcine Facility incinerator during waste transfer operations. Additionally, two pickup trucks, some road surfaces, and hallway carpets in another INTEC building were contaminated when workers left the Calciner.

*1999*

Jan. 7; New Waste Calciner Facility and CPP-665 and 679 fire detection system found inoperable for two weeks before corrected. Failure was due to degradation, however the Calciner operator attempted to cover up the system failure by destroying computer printout.

Jan. 11; Fire erupted in the New Waste Calciner Facility while bringing the Calciner into operation; a flexible, braided stainless steel oxygen hose for the Calciner vessel #4 fuel nozzle failed. This failure resulted in a spray of kerosene mist, which ignited in the cell.

Jan.15; New Waste Calciner Facility incinerator fire in the oxygen/kerosene fuel loop was caused by missing seals. It is believed that absence of these seals allowed oxygen and kerosene to leak, mix and catch fire at Calciner operating temperature.

Feb.3; Two of four air compressors fail at INTEC jeopardizing operating systems.

Feb.1/99 the Waste Reduction Operations Complex (WROC) Management was notified that a container (4x4x8 wooden box) of Mixed Low-Level Waste (MLLW) was moved from the Waste Experimental Reduction Facility (WERF) to the Idaho National Technical and Engineering Center (INTEC) because of waste characterization errors

Feb. 17; INTEC worker head and arms exposed to nitric acid leak.

Feb.19; High-level waste Tank Farm error resulted in 3,301 gallons being transferred to the wrong tank.

Mar.8; INTEC diesel driven fire water pump batteries explode during startup.

Mar.10; Power failure at INTEC lasted five hours.

Mar.16; Five New Waste Calcine Facility workers exposed at the base of the main stack to methylene chloride (105 ppm) and toluene (166 ppm) during off-gas sampling project. OSHA standard limits are 25 ppm.

May 26, 1999, the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, Division of Environmental Quality (DEQ), delivered to the Department of Energy (DOE) Idaho Operations Office a Notice of Violation (NOV) resulting from Hazardous Waste Management Act (HWMA)inspection and record reviews conducted of the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) facility from April through August 1998. The NOV was signed by DEQ on May 25, 1999, and was received by Lockheed Martin Idaho Technologies Company (LMITCO) from DOE-ID on June 16, 1999. The NOV documents eighty-six alleged violations (five at Argonne National Laboratory West (ANL-W) of hazardous waste law and permit requirements requiring action by DOE. Per the NOV, the total penalty assessed for the identified violations is $839,550. The compliance conference resulted in the following agreement between DOE and DEQ: based on information provided by DOE, DEQ would dismiss forty-one (41) of the alleged violations; DOE would not dispute thirty-three (33) of the alleged violations; and DOE would not agree with twelve (12) of the alleged violations but would agree to take action as specified by DEQ. A Consent Order addressing the subject NOV was issued by the DEQ on January 12, 2000. A total final penalty for the violations is $445,200.

April 1; Two New Waste Calcine Facility workers received exposure to methylene chloride and toluene during off-gas sampling over two month period. The exposure data indicated values that exceed twice the value of the limits established for a 40 hour workweek. [1999-0006]

April 7; Key to high radiation area was left unattended on a sign-on clipboard. This could

have resulted in exposure to more than 1 rem/hr.

May 5; INTEC potable water supply found contaminated with bacteria.

June 13; INTEC plant wide Emergency Communication System found to be inoperable due to degradation.

July15; New Waste Calcine Facility shift supervisor certification had expired two months prior in violation to operating rules.

Aug.23; Three of four air compressors fail New Waste Calcine Facility and the fourth was unable to maintain plant air demands.

Aug.24; New Waste Calcine Facility evacuated when air compressor ran out of fuel. This resulted in shortage of plant air impacting operating facilities when pressure dropped below the limits required to sustain operations. [1999-0011]

September 7, 1999 at 0650 the Radiological Control Technican (RCT) Foreman discovered that the LMITCO Management Control Procedure (MCP) MCP-362, Tritium Monitoring had been effective since August 10, 1999. This resulted in a procedure violation in that the smear papers required by the MCP (Whatman 41s) were not being used as required by the RCTs in their monitoring of the repackaging processes at the MWSF. The repackaging operations were not allowed to start until the required smear papers were available for use.

Sept.15; Portable breathing air compressor at INTEC used passed air quality check expiration date.

Sept.20; Worker arms contaminated at INTEC Tank Farm with 20,000 disintegrations per minute (dpm) or 50 mrem whole body dose through protective clothing [1999-0011]

Sept.22/99 TAN Job Supervisor was checking the status of worker training when he discovered that a waste handling employee did not have a current OSHA Refresher training card.

* 2000 *

Jan.13/2000, INTEC suffered a power failure that including loss of ventilation, and suspension of operational activities

Feb.1/2000, INTEC. The shoes of three trained radiation workers were found to be contaminated when they self-surveyed after exiting the normally clean portion of a tent erected over tank farm vessel WM-183. Two of the pairs of shoes had beta-gamma contamination levels of 16,000 disintegrations/minute (dpm) using the efficiency factor for Cesium-137, the predominant isotope. The third pair of shoes had contamination levels of 8,000 dpm. A survey of the "clean" area of the tent, a radiological buffer area, found beta-gamma contamination levels as high as 48,000 dpm.

Feb.28/00) INTEC Engineered Safety Feature Verification check of building CPP-651, it was discovered that an audible fire alarm designed to notify personnel of a fire system impairment of the building was in fact never installed.

Mar.8/00 INTEC CPP-602 . Upon exiting from working in a laboratory hood, contamination was detected on a lab coat and modesty clothing. This contamination read 20,000 disintigrations per minute (dpm).

March 9/2000 INTEC. LET&D; Water was observed leaking from process system piping of the Liquid Effluent Treatment and Disposal system (LET&D). The leak was from a section of piping thought to be isolated. This process consists of two independent, separate but connected units (#1 & #2). This process concentrates the condensate from the Process Equipment Waste Evaporator (PEWE) by removing any nitric acid for reuse and the water vapor is exhausted to the atmosphere via the main stack. An extensive construction effort was in progress on unit #1. The LET&D process on unit #2 had completed a maintenance period and was being restarted. During this same time period, the construction effort on unit #1 continued, piping blinds had been removed and replaced with a valve (HV-WLQ-289-3). This valve is designed to be a fail last position valve and was initially closed and thought to be an isolation boundary. When the water leak was discovered, this valve was noted to be open.

March 13/2000 INTEC , upon exiting the CPP-603 Fuels Storage area, 10,000 counts per minute (cpm), contamination was detected on a facility operator's plant clothing.

Mar.20/2000, INTEC the result of a routine bioassay (fecal) sample was reported and the routine bioassay sample was from an analyst working in the CPP-602 laboratory facility. The preliminary result was positive for plutonium (Pu) 238 and 239. The results of a follow-up fecal sample was received on 03/28/2000 and was positive for PU-238. The initial exposure calculation indicated an exposure of greater than 0.1 rem but less than 1.0 rem. This exposure does not exceed the limits specified in the Department of Energy (DOE) Radiological Control Manual table 2-1.

Mar.25/2000 INTEC, the level of Oxides of Nitrogen (Nox) emissions exceeded the operation limit for 24 minutes. Approved procedures were in use and a lengthy pre- job discussion preceded the event. The permit allows for the emission of 472 pounds per hour of NOx to the atmosphere. The permit limit was exceeded for 24 minutes and reached a release of 482 pounds per hour for a total of less than 10 pounds total in excess of the permitted value. The New Waste Calciner Facility (NWCF) was in normal operating mode at a temperature of 500 degrees C. This process generates NOx during normal operation. In accordance with approved operating procedures, the process temperature was being increased from 500 degrees C to 600 degrees C. During this rise in temperature, the NOx emissions exceeded the operating limit. Operators executed an Emergency and Abnormal Response (EAR) procedure which required that the feed to the Calciner be reduced or shut off. Feed to the calciner was reduced and eventually was shut off. The NOx release rates returned to normal a short time later.

April 17/2000 INTEC CPP-666, contamination was detected on a fuel handling operator's plant coveralls. A RCT surveyed the area and found 28,000 disintegration's per minute (dpm) per 100 centimeters squared beta gamma (no detectable alpha)

May 5/ 00 a temporary thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD), was not issued to a subcontractor representative (rep) working in the facility.

May 17/2000, (INTEC) received confirmation that the sample results for the nitrogen in the effluent from the INTEC Sewage Treatment Plant (STP) had exceeded the state permit limit for the April2000 monthly sample. This analysis, performed by an off-site laboratory facility, was 28.4 mg/L, exceeding the permit level of 20 mg/L.

May 23/2000, INTEC a positive Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) screening was received concerning the CPP-651 fire suppression system.. A release of fire water would be of concern because it would introduce moderator and may affect the potential for a criticality.

May 24/2000, INTEC; Tank Farm leak detection instruments found to be cross connected and non-functional. This is in violation of Technical Standard 4.2B10, Radiation Leak Detection Instruments Operability.

July 17/2000, INTEC Tank Farm found instruments to not be calibrated during a monthly review of instruments that were out of service on the Tank Farm. This violated the INTEC Technical Standard (TS) 15C2, Group I Instruments.

Representative Undated uncontrolled hazardous/high-level radioactive mixed waste releases and spills [40 CFR 265.31] related to Waste Area Group 3 (INTEC) Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study*. These releases contributed to significant ground water contamination. The High-level Tank Farm is used as a liquid waste storage for the high-level waste treatment operations.

1. Calcine transport pipe (CPP-633) leaked between Calciner and Storage Bin identified as CPP-13 contaminated 300 square feet of soil that required decontaminated.

2. Calcine Vessel Decontamination 10 gallon leak CPP-633 of hazardous/radioactive liquid containing 10 curies of radioactivity, identified as CPP-35.

3. Calcine Trench hazardous/radioactive release identified as CPP-93.

4. High-level Tank Farm service pipe to the Calciner leaked 2,500 gallons near Valve Box A-2 releasing 46,400 curies of radioactivity, identified as CPP-79.

5. Leak between tank WC-119 and WL-102 identified as CPP-25

6. Steam Flush Explosion high-level tank lines resulted in 13 acres contaminated, identified as CPP-26.

7. High-level waste tank WL-102 released 300 gallons containing 1,000 curies of radioactivity identified as CPP-37 & 33.

8. High-level tank WM-181 line leaked 3,629 gallons containing 46,400 curies of radioactivity, identified as CPP-28.

9.High-level tank WM-183 line leaked 14,000 gallons containing 40,988 curies of radioactivity, identified as CPP-31.

10. High-level liquid waste above ground pipe leak at Valve Box B-4, identified as CPP-32.

11. PEW Evaporator hazardous/radioactive 20,000 gallon leak, PEW condensate identified as CPP-58E. The leak was caused by a failure of the condensate transfer line between the PEW Evaporator and the Service Waste Diversion System

12. High-level waste transfer line leaked 750 gallons containing 8.44 curies of radioactivity, identified as CPP-36.

* Reference

Waste Area Group 3 Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study Final Work Plan, August 1995, prepared for US Department of Energy Idaho Operations Office, INEEL-95-0056.